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Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the inherent inequality and
the extent of redistribution by utilising the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database. This
database provides both market and disposable income distributions for a number of OECD
countries. Our finding that redistribution in OECD countries is positively associated with
inherent inequality is not the new one. The point we have made in this paper is that this
finding can be explained through the Mirrlees optimal income tax model. If the inherent
inequality increases (decreases) for any given incentive effects and the degree of espoused
egalitarianism so will the society’s redistributive effort.
21. Introduction
The OECD’s postwar history can be divided, at least roughly, into two phases.1 From 1945 to
about 1980 the degree of inherent inequality or the inequality of market incomes (incomes
from earnings and investment) decreased because of reduction in skilled/unskilled wage
differentials and asset inequality. The second phase has occurred between 1980 and the mid-
1990s when the degree of inherent inequality reversed course and increased. It is striking that
in a number of OECD countries inherent inequality has risen between 1980 and the mid-
1990s but perhaps surprisingly redistribution as well. What might be an explanation of this
evolution of redistribution policy? There is now a large literature on the relationship between
inequality and growth (see Perotti, 1992, 1996, Persson-Tabellini, 1994, Alesina-Rodrik,
1994, Tanninen, 2000 or Milanovic, 2000). A key element in this literature is the link between
inherent inequality and the extent of redistribution. The explanation of this literature is the
political mechanism (the median voter theory) through which greater inherent inequality leads
to greater redistribution. The median voter theory implies that if there is a redistribution of
income within the society, so that the income of the median voter increases, then the demand
for redistribution in the society will rise even though the average income remains the same.2
There are, however, some well-known and less well-known limitations of this theory. First,
we know that in many OECD countries voter participation rates are relatively low.3 This
means that the median voter is not the median income earner. Secondly, it is hard to believe
that the middle income voters are able to identify that they just belong to the fifth and sixth
decile of the market income distribution.
An analytical framework for thinking through the relationship between inherent inequality
and the extent of redistribution is put forward by James Mirrlees in his Nobel Prize winning
paper (Mirrlees, 1971). It captures the central features in thinking about the evolution of
redistribution policy. Three elements of the Mirrlees model are useful for our purposes. First
is the concept of inherent inequality reflecting among other skilled /unskilled wage
1 See Kanbur (1999).
2 Greater inherent inequality is usually expected to increase the gap between mean and median incomes, leading
to more redistribution because the loss to the median voter from an increase in the tax rate is now reduced
relative to his or her gain from the increased amount available for redistribution (see Meltzer-Richard, 1981 and
Persson-Tabellini, 1994).
3 Furthermore, there is a remarkable variation in voting activity between countries and some evidence on
declining trend in voting activity in several countries (see e.g. Blais-Dobrzynska 1998, or Tanninen, 2000).
3differentials, asset inequality and social norms. If there is no intervention by the government,
the inherent inequality will be fully reflected in the disposable income. However, if the
government want to intervene – as it seems to be the case in OECD countries – it will find the
second component of the Mirrlees model, the egalitarian objectives of the government. And if
the government tries to redistribute income from high-income people to low-income people,
there will be incentive and disincentive effects. In other words the redistribution policy is the
product of circumstances and objectives. Of course, distributional objectives differ from one
country to another and from one government to another, but there have not been significant
changes in the overall progressivity of the OECD countries between 1985 and 1994 (see
Messere, 1998). Given that we believe that holding constant the degree of egalitarianism
espoused and the level of incentive effects between the 1980 and the mid-1990s are not bad
approximations.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the inherent inequality and
the extent of redistribution by utilising the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database. This
database provides both market and disposable income distributions for a number of OECD
countries over last two or three decades. The structure of the paper is as follows. In sections 2
and 3 we look at what the data say. In section 4 we provide some theoretical explanations on
the relationship between the inherent inequality and the extent of redistribution. Section 5
concludes.
2. The Data and some summary findings
Most of the median voter studies mentioned in the introduction utilise data sets including the
largest possible number of countries all around the world. For example recent and widely
used data set compiled by Deininger and Squire (1996) covers 108 countries and 682
observations. However, such data sets have many problematic features that are discussed in
detail by Atkinson and Brandolini (2001). Furthermore, as Milanovic (2000) has recently
pointed, inequality is merely measured from disposable income and therefore do not properly
make a distinction between inherent income and redistribution (for different definitions of
income see Atkinson et al., 1995). Fortunately this distinction can be taken into account in the
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), which is a comparable data on income distribution for a
4maximum sample of 25 countries. Given the consistency of this source, which satisfies many
minimum quality requirements, income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient and the
squared coefficient of variation, CV2. The income and recipient concept employed here is
market income (MI), pension transfers (P) added to market income (MI+P) and disposable
income (DPI) per household where the latter has been adjusted by the square root of
household member.
Table 1. Changes in the inequality between 1980 and the mid-1990s in 12 OECD-countries;
(Gini coefficient for different income definitions).
Part A: Percentage point changes between “first wave” and “fourth” wave”
Country years MI MI+P GI DPI RD RD+P
AUS 81-94 5.6 6.2 3.3 3.2 2.4 3.0
BEL 85-92 -4.2 4.0 5.1 -0.7 -3.5 4.7
CAN 81-94 4.1 2.4 0.4 -1.0 5.1 3.4
FIN 87-95 5.7 6.7 1.7 2.2 3.5 4.5
FRA 79-89 1.9 -0.7 -2.2 -0.4 2.3 -0.3
GER 81-94 6.3 4.6 4.5 1.8 4.5 2.8
ITA 86-95 5.2 5.8 37.6 3.9 1.3 1.9
NET 83-94 -5.5 -4.7 -2.8 -0.2 -5.3 -4.5
NOR 79-95 1.1 -6.7 -2.1 -1.8 2.9 -4.9
SWE 81-95 4.1 6.8 1.7 2.0 2.1 4.8
UK 79-95 10.1 11.5 8.2 8.0 2.1 3.5
USA 79-94 6.2 5.0 5.7 5.8 0.4 -0.8
Part B: Percentage point changes between historical data bases and “first wave”
Country years MI MI+P GI DPI RD RD+P
CAN 75-81 -0.9 -1.0 -0.7 -0.9 0.0 -0.1
GER 73-81 3.8 -5.4 -1.1 -1.7 5.5 -3.7
SWE 67-81 -1.6 -8.8 -12.1 -11.2 9.6 2.4
UK 69-79 0.8 -1.5 -4.6 -4.8 5.6 3.3
USA 74-79 -0.4 0.7 -0.4 -1.4 1.0 2.1
Part C: Percentage point changes between historical data bases and “fourth” wave”
Country years MI MI+P GI DPI RD RD+P
CAN 75-94 3.2 1.4 -0.3 -1.9 5.1 3.3
GER 73-94 10.1 -0.8 3.4 0.1 10.0 -0.9
SWE 67-95 2.5 -2.0 -10.4 -9.2 11.7 7.2
UK 69-95 10.9 10.0 3.6 3.2 7.7 6.8
USA 74-94 5.6 5.6 4.8 3.9 1.7 1.7
Notes: For definitions see the Data Appendix. The LIS database has been collected in five
different periods. It contains historical bases for observations before 1979 and four
“waves”: around 1980, around 1985, around 1990, and around 1995. See
http://lisweb.ceps.lu/techdoc.htm
5As our interest is in the evolution of redistribution, our focus is in those 12 OECD countries
having at least three or more observations. In our sample the Gini coefficients and the squared
coefficients of variation can be summarized as follows (see also the figures for the individual
countries at the data appendix). Over the sample period the inequality of market income and
market income plus pension transfers has risen in many OECD countries, but not in all. The
extent of redistribution in turn has increased in almost all countries. Thus, the redistributive
role of government has corrected slightly increasingly for some of the increase in inherent
inequality. As shown in the Table 1, between 1980 and the mid-1990s in the United Kingdom
the Gini coefficient for market income increased by some10 percentage points; in Finland, in
Germany and in the United States by about 6 percentage points; and in Australia and in Italy
by around 7 points. On the other hand, during that time period the Gini coefficient for market
income decreased in the Netherlands by 5.5 percentage points. The extent of redistribution
(RD; measured as difference in the Gini coefficients between market and disposable
incomes), in turn, increased in Canada by more than 5 percentage points; in Germany by 4.5
percentage points and in Finland and in Norway around 3 percentage points. In the United
Kingdom the extent of redistribution increased by 2 percentage points; in the United States by
0.4 percentage points; and decreased in the Netherlands by about 5 percentage points. As the
second half of the Table 1 shows for five countries LIS data available, there is some evidence
for decreasing income inequality in the pre-1980s period, in particular, as inequality is
measured in disposable income. However and probably due to limited observations in the LIS
data, both the inherent inequality and the extent of redistribution has increased during the
period available for those five countries.
3. Empirical test
The relationship that we test can be expressed as follows
(1) RD = f(MI, x)
where RD is the extent of redistribution measured in terms of the difference between the
inequality measure for market income, MI, and the inequality measure for disposable income,
6DPI, RD = MI – DPI. x denotes control variables (e.g. dependence ratio, public employment
etc.).4
Table 2 reports the results for the relationship between inherent inequality and the extent of
redistribution for those 12 OECD countries having three or more observations since 1967. It
should be noted that our data set is an unbalanced panel what regards to the number of
observations for individual countries and to the division of observations between different
decades or between different waves of collection. Given our control variables for population
structure, government employment and unobserved country differences, Table 2 indicates that
increase in inherent inequality will increase the extent of redistribution.5 However, effect is
not particularly strong: in the most propitious case shown in column (5) one standard
deviation increase in the Gini coefficient for market income (i.e., 4.42) will increase the
redistribution (measured as the difference in the Gini coefficients between market and
disposable income) in 3 percentage points. In terms of standard deviations this is around 0.64
standard deviations of the extent of redistribution.
Of our two control variables, percentage share of government employment of total
employment, enters significantly into our regression equations in Table 2: one standard
deviation increase in government employment (5.31) will increase redistribution by 3.1
percentage points, which is 0.66 standard deviations of the extent of redistribution (calculated
from column 6). Our second control variable, dependency ratio, however, does not enter
significantly into our regression equations except in column (3) where we do not have country
dummies. In this case, one standard deviation increase in government employment (1.9) will
increase redistribution by 1.6 percentage points, which is 0.34 standard deviations of the
extent of redistribution. Finally, to control fixed effects, country dummies give us some
indication of general attitude towards redistribution in the society against to that in the United
States. Not surprisingly all of the coefficients have a positive sign. Given our two control
variables (in column 6), countries strongly in favour of redistribution are Belgium, Germany,
Finland and the Netherlands. Interestingly, when comparing columns (5) and (6) we can find
4 Full assessment of the extent of redistribution would also take account of various publicly provided services at
less than market value, which in Nordic countries are considerable. Many of these items - health care, education
and social services - are very extensive.
5 This is also well documented in the original work of Milanovic (2000) who mainly concentrated on the
evolution of income share gain between market and disposable income of particular income groups (i.e. bottom
half, bottom 20 per cent or the middle class). Given the same data set our focus is merely concentrated on extent
of redistribution in general.
7some evidence that redistribution has been organised through public employment in the
Nordic countries and in the lesser extent in Canada, France and Belgium.
Table 3 reports the results between inherent inequality and redistribution, when pensions are
included in market income. As discussed in Milanovic (2000: 37) in addition to their
redistributive role, pensions can be considered as deferred wages (i.e., redistribution over
time), and therefore, treating pensions as market income, we can better focus on those
government social transfers having a clearer redistributive role (e.g. unemployment benefits
and social assistance).6 Again, inherent inequality enters significantly into all of our
regression equations: one standard deviation increase in the Gini coefficient for market
income including pensions (4.65) will increase redistribution in column 4 by 2.6 percentage
points, which is 0.56 standard deviations of the extent of redistribution. As well as in the case
of our two control variables, the effect of inherent inequality is marginally diminished when
compared the estimations in Table 2. However, the main conclusions remain.
It is well known that different inequality measures weight different aspects of income
distribution and therefore might give a little different view of inequality (see e.g. Sen, 1997,
Lambert, 1993 or Cowell, 2000). Therefore it is in our interests to study whether our observed
relationship survives, when we utilise another inequality measure – namely the squared
coefficient of variation, CV2. As a measure differences between every pair of income and
their ranks, the Gini coefficient can be thought to place weight on observations nearby the
mode of income distribution, while squared coefficient of variation places more weight on
high incomes. Table 4 reports our results. As this LIS data is taken from a different source, we
first show the respective equations (3) and (6) of Table 2 in columns (1)-(2) of Table 4. As
can be seen, results for the Gini coefficients do not differ from each other. Furthermore, our
estimations for squared coefficient of variation confirm previous results: increase in inherent
inequality will increase the extent of redistribution. As shown in column (6) of Table 6, one
standard deviation increase in squared coefficient of variation for market income (0.36) will
increase the redistribution (measured as the difference in squared coefficient of variations
between market and disposable income) in 0.28, which is 0.98 standard deviations of the
extent of redistribution. Thus, our results for CV2 indicate somewhat stronger response –
while one standard deviation increase in inherent inequality measured in the Gini coefficient
6 Note that in fact in LIS definition pensions are included in market income and what Milanovic (2000: 373) has
included into market income is actually the social retirement benefits (see the Data Appendix).
8indicated increase in the extent of redistribution by two-thirds of standard deviation, the
relationship almost one-to-one, when CV2 is utilised.
Table 2. Inherent inequality and redistribution in 12 OECD-countries; (Gini coefficient);
OLS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CONSTANT -21.114
(-4.07)
-7.324
(-0.63)
6.159
(0.83)
-30.615
(-10.16)
-18.995
(-1.25)
-21.126
(-2.77)
INHERENT
INEQUALITY
0.561
(5.12)
0.496
(3.73)
0.538
(5.64)
0.637
(11.02)
0.679
(7.93)
0.602
(9.14)
PUBLIC
EMPL.
0.496
(9.01)
0.638
(8.46)
0.581
(5.66)
0.588
(5.12)
DEP.
RATIO
-0.029
(-0.11)
-0.854
(-3.61)
-0.134
(-0.38)
-0.229
(-1.51)
AUS 3.883
(7.22)
4.231
(5.51)
3.681
(6.67)
BEL 11.229
(13.46)
13.446
(15.22)
10.928
(12.52)
CAN 1.261
(1.34)
4.308
(3.95)
0.830
(0.83)
FIN 7.507
(5.88)
11.451
(7.44)
6.680
(4.83)
FRA 2.012
(2.22)
5.482
(6.69)
2.125
(2.10)
GER 8.472
(12.87)
7.900
(6.09)
7.871
(11.21)
ITA 3.250
(2.99)
3.818
(2.29)
2.417
(2.01)
NET 6.812
(10.44)
5.274
(3.90)
6.111
(7.64)
NOR 3.173
(2.02)
10.621
(11.56)
3.160
(1.82)
SWE 4.314
(2.33)
12.010
(5.62)
4.433
(2.14)
UK 2.671
(3.02)
4.828
(4.15)
2.905
(3.13)
nobs. 55 55 55 55 55 55
adj. R2 0.508 0.188 0.596 0.936 0.835 0.938
SEE 3.305 4.248 2.995 1.191 1.916 1.177
Notes: Redistribution and inherent inequality are measured in Gini coefficients. White
heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
9Table 3. Inherent inequality (ingl. pensions) and redistribution in 12 OECD-countries; (Gini
coefficient); OLS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CONSTANT -12.014
(-3.31)
-12.963
(-1.59)
-8.512
(-1.14)
-26.317
(-7.76)
-20.576
(-3.81)
-30.989
(-4.71)
INHERENT
INEQUALITY
0.335
(4.43)
0.180
(2.17)
0.356
(4.52)
0.595
(10.58)
0.514
(6.03)
0.602
(10.59)
PUBLIC
EMPL.
0.343
(6.24)
0.373
(5.07)
0.340
(2.76)
0.342
(2.90)
DEP.
RATIO
0.410
(1.74)
-0.145
(-0.59)
0.095
(0.52)
0.125
(0.93)
AUS 4.012
(7.15)
4.236
(7.96)
4.106
(6.95)
BEL 7.358
(5.69)
8.152
(6.29)
7.605
(5.90)
CAN 2.337
(2.44)
3.797
(4.31)
2.480
(2.50)
FIN 8.799
(7.98)
10.278
(9.98)
9.070
(8.40)
FRA 1.969
(2.12)
3.551
(5.38)
1.888
(2.06)
GER 6.048
(7.41)
5.194
(5.65)
6.364
(6.80)
ITA 0.404
(0.34)
0.465
(0.43)
0.878
(0.70)
NET 5.607
(7.40)
4.935
(5.22)
5.998
(6.39)
NOR 5.788
(3.03)
9.132
(7.92)
5.625
(2.97)
SWE 4.578
(2.13)
8.191
(4.11)
4.458
(2.14)
UK 2.936
(3.47)
3.708
(3.96)
2.775
(3.13)
nobs. 55 55 55 55 55 55
adj. R2 0.379 0.124 0.373 0.847 0.774 0.846
SEE 2.443 2.900 2.455 1.213 1.474 1.218
Notes: Redistribution and inherent inequality are measured in Gini coefficients. White
heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 4. Inherent inequality and redistribution in 12 OECD-countries; (Gini coefficient (1)
and (2), CV2 (3)-(6)); OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CONSTANT 6.162
(1.90)
-0.159
(-1.70)
-0.333
(-4.05)
0.157
(0.51)
-0.931
(-2.04)
-1.051
(-2.22)
INHERENT
INEQUALITY
0.550
(7.14)
0.574
(6.90)
0.741
(9.85)
0.755
(9.68)
0.768
(11.35)
0.767
(10.99)
PUBLIC
EMPL
0.692
(8.65)
0.363
(4.87)
0.928
(3.80)
1.278
(4.10)
0.536
(0.77)
DEP.
RATIO
-1.131
(-3.95)
-0.147
(-0.66)
-1.695
(-1.79)
1.858
(1.43)
1.964
(1.52)
AUS 0.0343
(5.28)
0.133
(2.75)
0.130
(2.70)
BEL 0.0934
(7.73)
0.265
(4.92)
0.243
(3.99)
CAN 0.0153
(1.33)
0.135
(2.55)
0.109
(1.73)
FIN 0.0690
(4.62)
0.248
(4.29)
0.215
(2.91)
FRA 0.0245
(1.75)
0.111
(1.28)
0.081
(0.82)
GER 0.076
(7.65)
0.221
(3.23)
0.226
(3.28)
ITA 0.0104
(0.79)
0.036
(0.54)
0.030
(0.46)
NET 0.0630
(6.77)
0.145
(1.94)
0.159
(2.09)
NOR 0.0423
(2.77)
0.115
(1.75)
0.049
(0.53)
SWE 0.0772
(6.63)
0.235
(4.74)
0.153
(1.33)
UK 0.0301
(3.34)
-0.012
(-0.13)
-0.032
(-0.36)
nobs. 48 48 48 48 48 48
Aaj. R2 0.615 0.931 0.870 0.875 0.916 0.915
SEE 0.028 0.012 0.102 0.100 0.082 0.082
Notes: LIS-data is provided by Markus Jäntti. This data is not in percentages.
Redistribution and inherent inequality are measured in columns (1) and (2) in Gini
coefficients and in columns (4)-(6) in squared coefficient of variations (CV2’s).
White heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
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Of course, there are several reasons to be cautious about our results. Our sample is relatively
small. There may be problems with measurement errors and with endogeneity of our
explanatory variable. It is possible that the redistributive policy has itself caused rising
inequality of market incomes (cf. Lindbeck, 1997). In principle we can distinguish two ways
of redistributing income, a direct one, transferring income between different individuals and
an indirect one, through manipulations of equilibrium quantities and prices (wages). For
examples an increase in the statutory progressivity of tax/transfer system could make
members of lower-income group worse off, because it reduces their before-tax wage rates. It
is not easy empirically to separate out these two effects.
4. Possible explanations
(i) Optimal non-linear tax theory7
The statistical association between the extent of redistribution and inherent inequality appears
to be a robust one. The question is why this relationship exists. The simplest model in which
incentives, inherent inequality, preferences for equity, and revenue requirement can be
integrated in a coherent framework, and which can provide a useful background for the
questions we are interested in, turns out to be the Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal non-linear
income taxation. In this model there is inherent inequality because individuals differ in their
labour productivities. The government chooses a non-linear income tax and transfer schedule
to maximize a welfare function, which is in principle sensitive to inequality, but does so with
the added constraint that individuals choose their labour supply in response to the tax
function. The government must also satisfy the overall budget balance constraint, with tax
revenues equal to outlays. Unfortunately, however, as well recognised in the literature, closed
form analytical results are few.
However, in the tradition of the non-linear tax theory following, we can provide better
understanding of the form of optimal redistribution policy through numerical simulations.
7 There is another strand of optimal redistribution literature (see Mirrlees, 1974, Varian, 1980, Tuomala, 1990)
that stresses the social insurance role of redistributive taxation. In this framework, an increase in variability of
income would also increase the optimal degree of progressivity, because it increases the insurance value of the
progressivity.
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With these techniques, we can compute post tax income at each level of marginal
productivities or abilities (in the sense of wage rates), and thus calculate inequality of pre and
post tax/transfer income as well as total income, for different values of key parameters. For
our purposes the result from Kanbur-Tuomala (1994) are the most useful ones. They show
that the inherent inequality plays a critical role in the pattern of optimal redistribution. Their
focus is on the consequences of varying the standard deviation of wage rates. The “industry
standard” assumption has been of a log-normal distribution of wages, with a standard
deviation of logs of 0.39. Kanbur-Tuomala maintain the assumption of log-normal
distribution but consider cases in which the standard deviation of logs is greater than 0.39.
They choose a standard deviation of 0.7 and 1.0. Mirrlees (1971) justified his choice of 0.39
for the distribution of wage rates from the work of Lydall (1968) on earnings distributions.
But the distribution of earnings is not the distribution of wages. For this reason Kanbur-
Tuomala (1994) calibrate the log-normal wage (ability) distribution so that the income
distribution inferred from the wage distribution matches the actual distribution. We can also
find strong support for higher values in recent inequality estimates of OECD countries based
on LIS data (see figure in appendix). We know (see Aitchison-Brown, 1957: Theorem 2.7 and
table A1) that if the standard deviations are 0.7 and 1.0 then the Gini coefficients are 0.379
and 0.52. Thus it seems to us that the computations based with 0.7 and 1.0 are not based on
empirically implausible estimates8.
Simulation studies, using an unweighted utilitarian social welfare function and a standard
deviation of 0.39, suggest that declining marginal rates are optimal. The counter-intuitiveness
of these results is lessened once it is noted that marginal tax rates are a relatively poor
indication of redistribution powers of an optimal tax structure. In fact, income redistribution is
accomplished by giving everyone a sizable poll subsidy and then taxing it away with a
declining marginal rate on income and consequently to lessen the disincentives for high
productivity workers. Therefore average tax rates may tell more about the extent of
redistribution. The average rates range from –13 percent at the tenth percentile point to 31
percent at the 99th percentile of the distribution. Changing the standard deviation to 0.7, the
schedule takes a very different shape. It becomes mildly progressive through most of its
range. At the bottom of the wage distribution, the marginal tax rate is 57 percent. The
8 In all cases Kanbur-Tuomala (1994) assume an elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure of
0.5 and the ratio of government revenue to national income is 10 percent, which is spent on public goods in a
way that does not affect the rest of the model.
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marginal rate rises to 63 percent by the middle of the distribution (median), and stays there
until almost the ninetieth percentile of the distribution. The average tax rates in turn range
from –99 percent at the tenth percentile point to 43 percent. With a standard deviation of 1.0,
marginal rates range from 47 percent at the bottom to 74 percent at the 84 eighty-forty
percentile. Using a weighted utilitarian social welfare function and a standard deviation of
1.0 the lowest marginal rate is 69 percent and the highest is 80 percent. The average rate
varies from –100 percent at the tenth percentile point to 62 percent at the 99th percentile point.
In sum, Kanbur-Tuomala (1994) show that when inherent inequality increases the optimum
income tax/transfer system becomes more progressive, taxing the better off at higher rates to
support the less well off. Thus, one of the policy responses in rise of inherent inequality
should be a greater willingness to redistribute through the tax and transfer system. As the
degree of inherent inequality changes, for any given degree of egalitarianism and any given
degree of incentive effects, so will the amount of redistribution you will attempt to achieve.
And similarly, if the inherent inequality decreases, the redistributive role of the government
budget decreases.
(ii) Other explanations
The prediction of (“rational”) public choice theory of the size of government proposed by
Meltzer-Richard (1981) is also that a greater inherent inequality should also increase the
amount of redistribution. In their model increased inequality increases mean income relative
to the income of the decisive voter and, thus, makes redistribution more attractive to him or
her. Persson-Tabellini (1994) and Alesina-Rodrik (1994) among others incorporate versions
of this result in constructing models of why greater pre-tax-and-transfer inequality is harmful
for economic growth.
Perhaps most surprisingly, some authors have suggested that redistribution is greater the less
inherent inequality there is (see e.g. Peltzman, 1980, Persson, 1995 and Lindert, 2000).
Peltzman’s starting point was his observations that in the US greater inherent inequality
seemed to lead less redistribution. He attempts an explanation in a model in which the total
support for redistribution increases if income inequality between middle and lower income
groups narrow. The problem with this explanation is that because income inequality tends to
increase both within group and between group inequality, a decomposition analysis of income
14
inequality tells that the net effect on redistribution is indeterminate. Persson (1995), in turn,
provides an explanation based on the notion that people care not only about the level of their
own incomes but also about their incomes relative to those others. Thus people neglect the
envy their incomes cause others so that introducing a linear income tax with relatively little
inherent inequality can yield Pareto improvement. It is not easy to see how the relationship
might go in this way. Keen (1997) writes “such preferences imply, for example, that the non-
poor would actually gain by taking resources away from the poor and simply throwing them
away”. At least our empirical study does not support that redistribution is negatively
correlated to inherent inequality.
5. Conclusions
Our finding that redistribution in OECD countries is positively associated with inherent
inequality is not the new one. The point we have made here is that this finding can be
explained through the Mirrlees model. If the inherent inequality increases (decreases) for any
given incentive effects and the degree of espoused egalitarianism so will the society’s
redistributive effort.
Our empirical results are based on the assumption that the degree of espoused egalitarianism
has remained constant over the period considered. There is, however, some recent individual
country evidence that there could have been a shift in norms causing government to become
less willing to finance transfers and to levy progressive taxes (e.g. in the UK and Finland; see
Atkinson, 1999) leading to reduction in the extent of redistribution. One could argue in line
with Atkinson that these kinds of changes have been episodic rather than time trend and
therefore rather difficult to justify in the context of median voter models. Thus, future
research should be focussed on the role of the egalitarian objects of government, which is also
an important component of the Mirrlees model.
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Data Appendix:
Industrialised countries included: Australia (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Finland
(FIN), France (FRA), (West-) Germany (GER), Ireland (IRE), Italy (ITA), the Netherlands
(NET), Norway (NOR), Sweden (SWE), The United Kingdom (UK), the United States.
Countries excluded: Austria (AUT) [only 2 observations & not included in Milanovic (2000)],
Denmark (DEN) [only 2 observations], Ireland (IRE) [only 1 observation], Luxembourg
(LUX), Spain (SPA) [only 2 observations].
For full list of countries, see http://lisweb.ceps.lu/techdoc/datasets.htm
Income inequality
All measures of income inequality are originally from the LIS DataBase
(http://www.lis.ceps.lu/). Figures for Tables 1-3 are from Milanovic (2000, 396-398)
Appendix A (Gini coefficients). Figures for Table 4 are kindly provided by Markus Jäntti.
Income variables utilised (see Milanovic 2000, 373 note 7) and LIS
(http://lisweb.ceps.lu/techdoc.htm):
Market income (MI): factor income [V1: net income and salary income + V4: farm self-
employment income + V5: non-farm self-income + V8: cash property income] plus [V32:
private pensions + V33: public sector pensions]
Market income plus pensions (MI+P): MI plus [V19: social retirement benefits]. What
regards to pensions please, note the definition of market income.
Gross income (GI): MI plus [V19: social retirement benefits + V20: child or family
allowances + V21: unemployment compensation + V16: sick pay + V17: accident pay + V18:
disability pay + V22: maternity pay + V23: military/vet/war benefits + V24: other social
insurance, V25: means-tested cash benefits + V26: near-cash benefits + V34: alimony or child
support + V35: other regular private income + V36: other cash income]
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Disposable income (DPI): GI plus [V7: mandatory contributions to self-employed + V13:
mandatory employee contribution + V11: income tax]
Redistribution (RD): The difference between the inequality measure for market income, MI,
and the inequality measure for disposable income, DPI.
Redistribution plus pensions (RD+P): The difference between the inequality measure for
market income including pension transfers, MI-P, and the inequality measure for disposable
income, DPI.
Other variables:
Dependency ratio (DepR): Population under 16-years and over 64-years as percentage of
total population. Source: OECD data base (Economic Outlook) provided by in Finland by
Etlatieto.
Government employment (GE): General government employment as percentage of total
employment. Source: OECD data base (Economic Outlook) provided by Etlatieto.
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MI MI+P DPI RD RD+P
min 46.0 34.0 33.4 12.6 8.5
max 51.6 38.0 36.6 15.0 11.5
diff 5.6 4.0 3.2 2.4 3.0
aver 48.5 35.5 34.8 13.6 9.8
stdev 2.34 2.20 1.35 1.00 1.31
diff/stdevs 2.39 1.82 2.37 2.40 2.29
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MI MI+P DPI RD RD+P
min 50.0 34.0 26.0 23.1 7.3
max 54.6 38.0 26.9 27.9 12.0
diff 4.6 4.0 0.9 4.8 4.7
aver 51.7 35.5 26.5 25.1 8.9
stdev 2.55 2.20 0.47 2.48 2.66
diff/stdevs 1.81 1.82 1.90 1.93 1.77
Gini coefficients for four income definitions in Belgium
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MI MI+P DPI RD RD+P
min 42.9 39.8 32.6 9.0 5.9
max 47.0 42.2 34.8 14.1 9.3
diff 4.1 2.4 2.2 5.1 3.4
aver 44.7 40.9 33.5 11.2 7.4
stdev 1.60 0.94 0.87 2.29 1.59
diff/stdevs 2.56 2.56 2.52 2.22 2.13
Gini coefficients for four income definitions in Canada
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MI MI+P DPI RD RD+P
min 36.4 32.5 23.3 12.7 9.2
max 42.1 39.2 25.5 16.6 13.7
diff 5.7 6.7 2.2 3.9 4.5
aver 38.4 35.1 24.2 14.1 10.8
stdev 3.23 3.61 1.14 2.15 2.49
diff/stdevs 1.76 1.85 1.93 1.82 1.81
Gini coefficients for four income definitions in Finland
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min 40.5 39.3 32.7 7.8 6.6
max 52.8 42.8 34.6 18.6 8.4
diff 12.3 3.5 1.9 10.8 1.8
aver 49.1 41.8 34.0 15.1 7.8
stdev 5.79 1.67 0.87 4.98 0.81
diff/stdevs 2.13 2.10 2.20 2.17 2.22
Gini coefficients for four income definitions in France
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MI MI+P DPI RD RD+P
min 40.3 33.9 29.1 9.2 4.1
max 50.4 40.2 31.2 19.2 9.1
diff 10.1 6.3 2.1 10.0 5.0
aver 45.1 36.2 29.9 15.2 6.3
stdev 3.51 2.52 0.87 3.64 1.81
diff/stdevs 2.88 2.50 2.41 2.75 2.76
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min 44.9 33.7 32.4 12.4 0.3
max 51.3 39.8 37.6 13.7 2.2
diff 6.4 6.1 5.2 1.3 1.9
aver 47.4 35.8 34.6 12.9 1.3
stdev 3.40 3.44 2.71 0.72 0.95
diff/stdevs 1.88 1.77 1.92 1.80 2.00
Gini coefficients for four income definitions in Italy
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min 45.0 40.0 32.7 11.2 6.2
max 50.5 44.7 34.0 17.0 11.6
diff 5.5 4.7 1.3 5.8 5.4
aver 48.0 42.6 33.4 14.7 9.3
stdev 2.54 2.27 0.65 2.66 2.41
diff/stdevs 2.17 2.07 2.01 2.18 2.24
Gini coeff.s for four income definitions in the Netherlands
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min 39.5 34.4 25.5 14.0 8.3
max 44.3 43.2 28.5 17.6 14.7
diff 4.8 8.8 3.0 3.6 6.4
aver 42.2 38.4 26.7 15.5 11.7
stdev 2.09 3.82 1.30 1.56 3.13
diff/stdevs 2.30 2.30 2.31 2.31 2.04
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min 45.6 33.7 24.2 12.5 7.1
max 51.3 42.5 35.4 24.9 14.3
diff 5.7 8.8 11.2 12.4 7.2
aver 48.2 37.4 27.2 21.0 10.2
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diff/stdevs 2.53 2.46 2.74 2.76 2.84
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MI MI+P DPI RD RD+P
min 39.3 34.9 30.1 8.2 3.8
max 54.7 50.0 38.1 18.3 12.3
diff 15.4 15.1 8.0 10.1 8.5
aver 47.9 42.9 34.3 13.6 8.6
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min 46.4 42.7 36.4 9.0 4.9
max 52.6 48.4 42.2 10.7 7.0
diff 6.2 5.7 5.8 1.7 2.1
aver 49.4 45.6 39.5 10.0 6.1
stdev 2.67 2.40 2.22 0.62 0.73
diff/stdevs 2.32 2.38 2.61 2.73 2.89
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